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TAXATION OF INSURANCE TRusTs.-Innumerable attempts to
1
evade taxes have led in recent years to much litigation and confusion.
the
to
circumvent
used
methods
of
these
prevalent
most
of
the
One
tax laws is the trust. By the creation of trusts, incomes have been
so divided and subdivided as to withdraw from the government the
benefit of the graduated taxes and surtaxes applicable to income when
concentrated in a single ownership.2 The courts, in their attempt to
prevent these circumventions of the law, have often gone beyond the
strict interpretation of the statutes and have included as taxable those
cases which were not expressly covered by the law.3 Income from
revocable trusts has been taxed to the settlor for the reason that he
still retained control and dominion over the, property. 4 The courts
have disregarded the refinements of legal title and have sought to tax
the person with actual command over the property taxedY In their
liberal construction of these acts, however, the courts must keep
within the limitations of the Constitution, particularly those of the
Fifth Amendment.0 Congress may not be permitted to tax A for the

'Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the
Taxable Persons (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 791. This article was written in connection with a research project on the subject conducted by Professors Robert
M. Haig and Roswell Magill of Columbia University.
2Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. -, 53 Sup. Ct. 761, 763 (1933).
SBullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916) ; Saltonstall v.
Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928); Chase National Bank v.
United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct 126 (1929); Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S.
376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930) ; Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct.
356 (1930); see Note (1931)

29 MicH. L. REV. 796; (1928)

41 HARV. L.

REV. 916.

'REVENUE ACT OF 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 313, c. 234, §§319, 320, 26 U. S. C.,
§§1131, 1132, "where the grantor of a trust has, at any time during the taxable
year, either alone or in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary of the
trust, the power to revest in himself title to any part of the corpus of the trust,
then the income of such part of the trust for such taxable year shall be included
in computing the net income of the grantor"; Corliss v. Bowers, supra note 3;
Reinecke v. Smith, 288 U. S. 596, 53 Sup. Ct. 570 (1933) ; Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (1933) ; Note (1933) 7 ST. JoHN'S L. REV.
357; see (1930) 28 MicE. L. REv. 778.
Supra notes 3 and 4.
'UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AmENDMENTS, Art. V: "No person shall

*** be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation"; Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 259 Pac. 42 (1927) ;
Southern California Telephone Co. v. State, etc., 201 Cal. 474, 259 Pac. 47
(1927). These cases are authority for the proposition that, where a tax statute
conflicts with a constitutional provision, the Constitution must prevail.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
property of B, or to impose a tax upon C for the income of D.' So,
also, if a man creates an irrevocable trust, giving all the benefits and
powers of control to another, it is considered an executed gift, the
income of which cannot be taxed to the settlor.8
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, 9 the taxpayer created five similar trusts. All five were irrevocable. In the first, he assigned $100,000 worth of securities to the
Minneapolis Trust Co. The income from the securities was to be
used to pay the annual premiums upon a policy of insurance for
$100,000 on the life of the settlor. The excess income, if any, was
to be accumulated until an amount sufficient to pay an additional
annual premium had been reserved. Additional income was to be
paid to a daughter, if the trustee so desired. After the grantor's
death, the trustee was to collect the policy and with the entire proceeds was to buy securities belonging to the "Wells estate" at their
appraised value. These securities were to be held in trust for the
daughter. Upon her death, the trut was to end and be divided as
she might appoint in her will, in the event of a failure of appointment
or issue, to Wells' sons. The court. Mr. Justice Cardozo writing
the opinion, reversed the decision of the lower court and held the
income of the insurance trust taxable to the settlor. The section of
the Internal Revenue Act under which the Commissioner brought
this action 10 was held to be constitutional and not an arbitrary taking
With this conof property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.'
clusion the writer respectfully disagrees.
'Henier v. Donan, 285 U. S. 312, 326. 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 361 (1932) : "This
proposition is also true of cases arising under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which is similar to that of the Fifth Amendment.
Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U. S. 206, 215, 52 Sup. Ct. 120,
122 (1931). We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions
which underlie our system, any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one
person's property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That which is not in fact the
taxpayer's income cannot be made such by calling it income."
'Ibid.; KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1930) 1142; see also In re
Ponzi, 6 F. (2d) 324 (1925) ; Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F. (2d) 476 (1930);
Ferguson v. Com'r, 59 F. (2d) 891 (1932).
'Burnet v. Wells, supra note 2.
" REVENUE ACT OF 1924, 42 STAT. 253, 26 U. S. CODE §960 (26 U. S. C. A.
§960 n.), "Where any part of the income of a trust is or may be applied to the
payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor
(except policies irrevocably payable for the purposes and in the manner specified in paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of sections 214, 955 (the exception
having relation to trusts for charities), such part of the income of the trust
shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor." This section
was incorporated in the Revenue Act of 1926.
' Supra note 6.
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Mr. Justice Cardozo in his opinion states:

12

"One who takes out a policy on his own life, after application
in his own name accepted by the company, becomes in so doing
a party to a contract, though the benefits of the insurance are
to accrue to someone else."
If the benefits accrue to another and the entire power of control
and dominion over the trust corpus is divorced from the settlor, the
trust being irrevocable, what is left on which to tax him? Although
it is true that the settlor may sue the Minneapolis Trust Company,
the trustee, if it were to refuse to apply the income to the preservation
of the insurance, and hold it to its duty, this does not vest in him any
interest which may be taxable.1 3 Wells could not end his interests in
the policies through non-payment of the premiums or stamp out the
contract. 14 As far as he was concerned, this was an executed gift in
which his interest ceased to exist.
Mr. Justice Cardozo again states:1 5
"Income permanently applied by the act of the taxpayer to
the maintenance of contracts of insurance made in his name
for the support of his dependents is income used for his benefit
in such a sense and to such a degree that there is nothing
arbitrary or tyrannical in taxing it as his."
Life insurance today has become a common practice. Piactically
every family head in the United States has a policy of insurance on
his life. Up to the present time, however, it has not been made compulsory by law. The only benefit derived by the policy-holder is the
personal satisfaction from the fact that his dependents will be taken
care of after his death. It is not analogous to the case cited by the
Court, 16 wherein the settlor created a trust, to give insurance proceeds to creditors. In the latter case the settlor is actually benefited
by having his indebtedness reduced. The courts in such a case should
uphold a tax upon the settlor because the income from the trust
accrues to his benefit by reducing his legal obligations.1T The other
'Burnet v. Wells, supra note 2, 53 Sup. Ct. at 764; see Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Hurin Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167, 44 Sup. Ct. 90 (1923).

" Burnet v. Wells, supra note 2, 53 Sup. Ct. at 764 and cases cited therein;
see supra note 1, at 791.

" The trust being expressly declared irrevocable by the settlor, his power

in its administration was lost.
"Burnet v. Wells, supra note 2, 53 Sup. Ct. at 765.
10

Ibid.

Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126
(1929); Wells v. Com'r, 63 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); Sampson v.
United States, 1 Fed. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1932).
'
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case cited by the Court contains a blanket trust created for the payment of all the items of the settlor's and the family budget. This is
also very dissimilar to the life insurance trust in the instant case. In
the former, the income, like that of the trust, in favor of creditors,
is used to pay the legal obligations of the settlor.'8 This he is bound
to do. In the case under discussion, however, only a moral obligation
of the creator of the trust is settled. When one uses the income of a
trust to pay his personal legal obligations he is indirectly receiving
the benefits therefrom and should be taxed thereon. 19 Where, however, he irrevocably transfers to others both the corpus and income
of a trust to pay for something which will accrue solely to the benefit
of a third person, we do not see how he can be taxed upon the
income without
violating his constitutional rights under the Fifth
20
Amendment.
It is respectfully submitted that the trust, in the instant case, is
similar to a charitable trust which has been expressly exempt from
the tax. 21 Both trusts leave in the creator only a certain amount of
happiness and security of mind and these do not justify a tax under
the statute.
ALFRED HECKER.

THE MINNESOTA TEA CASE.-Because of the wording of the
statute ' the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in the case of the

Minnesota Tea Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 2
will in our opinion be reversed.

In the Minnesota Tea case 3 the petitioner (Minnesota Tea
Company) transferred its real estate and some miscellaneous prop'Van Valkerburg v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480 (N. Y. 1816) ; Wanamaker v.
Weaver, 176 N. Y. 75, 68 N. E. 135 (1903) ; De Brawere v. De Brawere, 203
N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722 (1911) ; Frank v. Carter, 219 N. Y. 35, 113 N. E. 549
(1916) ; Laumeier v. Laumeier, 237 N. Y. 357, 143 N. E. 219 (1924).
"Supra note 17.
' Supra note 6.
' Supra note 10, §§214, 955, par. 10, subd. a.
'REv. AcT 1928 §112 (i) (1) : "As used in this Section and in Sections 113
and 115 * * * the term 'reorganization' means (A) a merger or consolidation
(including the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the
voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the properties of
another corporation), or (B) a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its
assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferror or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which
the assets are transferred, or (C) a recapitalization, or (D) a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization, however effected."
18 B. T. A. -

Ibid.

(June, 1933).

